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ST. JOHN FISHER COLLEGE 
ACCOUNTING FOR LABOR 
IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY: 
THE U.S. ARMS MAKING EXPERIENCE 
Abstract: The national armory at Springfield was the largest proto-
type of the modern factory establishment and its accounting 
controls were described by Alfred Chandler [1977] as the most 
sophisticated in use before the early 1840s. In spite of that, armory 
management did not integrate piece-rate accounting and a clock-
regulated workday to produce prespecified norms of output. Hoskin 
& Macve [1988] have recently suggested that the armory's ac-
counting controls were unable to attain disciplinary power over 
labor and increase labor productivity until a West Point trained 
managerial component had been established at the armory after 
1840. They called for a reexamination of the historical record from 
a disciplinary rather than economic perspective to validate this 
doctrine. The paper presents the findings of this reexamination and 
indicates that West Point management training was a relatively 
minor determinant in the evolving nature of accounting. Several 
economic and social factors are found to better explain why 
integration did not occur any sooner than it did at the Springfield 
armory. 
The national armory at Springfield was the largest and 
among the most important prototypes of the modern factory 
establishment and its accounting procedures and controls were 
the most sophisticated in use before the early 1840s [Chandler, 
1977]. Until that time, however, the armory's accounting system 
was not designed to integrate piece-rate accounting and a 
clock-regulated workday. 
Hoskin & Macve [1988] have argued that the presence of 
West Point trained management at Springfield after 1840 was 
the key factor in the application of accounting to enforce norms 
of output, attain disciplinary power over labor, and yield sig-
nificant labor productivity gains. The role of accounting at the 
Springfield armory and the significance of a West Point trained 
management component are the main subjects of this study. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE EARLY U.S. ARMS MAKING INDUSTRY 
In response to a severe shortage of small f irearms during the 
Revolutionary War, Congress in 1794 established national ar-
mories at Springfield, Massachusetts and Harpers Ferry, Vir-
ginia. Because these armories were unable to fully meet the 
government's needs, 27 private manufacturers in 1798 were 
awarded two year contracts totalling 40,200 muskets.1 Contract 
work was especially attractive because the government made 
cash-advance payments of between $.50 and $2.00 per musket 
and contract renewals were based on satisfactory performance 
and were usually automatic. 
As a result of the faulty performance of small arms during 
the War of 1812, the national armories were placed under 
military oversight and jurisdiction of the Ordnance Department 
in 1815 to promote "greater systematization and efficiency" 
[Smith, 1977, p. 106] and to establish clear-cut lines of adminis-
trative authority and responsibility [Uselding, 1973]. In order to 
obtain government contracts, private arms makers had to sup-
ply firearms at a price based on the cost figures incurred at 
Springfield. Accordingly, the contractors were granted full ac-
cess to armory facilities to examine the cost records and produc-
tion methods. 
Soon after the economic panic and depression of 1837-43, 
private arms makers were able to increase their customer base 
and reduce their overall dependence on federal contracts. A 
number of new and better capitalized arms makers such as Colt, 
Smith & Wesson, and Lawrence & Robbins also entered the 
industry. Concurrently, the government changed from an exclu-
sive system of renewable cash-advance contracts to one em-
phasizing open-market purchases. This policy shift had major 
financial consequences to marginally profitable and under-
capitalized suppliers, forcing the vast majori ty of them to leave 
the industry.2 
From 1850 onwards, production activities in the small arms 
industry became predominantly mechanized and machine-
directed as the dual goals of par ts uniformity and full inter-
1Eli Whitney received the largest of these initial contracts for 10,000 arms. 
The contract price was $13.40 per stand of arms and $5,000 was paid in advance. 
The terms of the contract specified total shipment by September 30, 1800, but in 
fact, Whitney did not fully complete the contract until 1809. See Mirsky and 
Nevins [1952] for more details. 
2Of all the pre-1830 private and government arms manufacturers, only the 
Whitney and Springfield armories survived through the Civil War. 
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changeability were achieved. The industry also became domi-
nated by large patent arms makers, several of whom have 
survived until the present day. 
SPRINGFIELD ARMORY'S ACCOUNTING SYSTEM3 
The Springfield armory's accounting system was originally 
designed to summarize financial transactions, to record the 
movement of goods to and from inventories, and to establish 
and enforce individual worker accountability for unnecessary 
loss or waste. Major Dalliba of the Ordnance Department 
conducted a detailed inspection of the Springfield armory in 
1819. Included in his report (referenced under "American State 
Papers") was a detailed discussion of the armory's accounting 
policies and their rationales. The armory used a form of "charge 
and discharge" accounting and maintained detailed records on 
raw materials, work in progress, and work completed. Monthly 
payroll accounts contained the name of each workman, the 
piece-rate for each task, and the type and quality of work 
performed.4 
The Springfield armory's accounting system provided the 
means of controlling and coordinating arms inventories. Until 
the early 1840s, accounting was not used to obtain greater 
control over internal production processes or to improve cost 
efficiency, perhaps because the national armories operated in a 
guaranteed market having Congressionally authorized and an-
nually stable output levels. Hoskin and Macve [1988] contend, 
however, that the inability to integrate accountability and work 
discipline, through a clock-regulated workday and pre-specified 
norms of output, better explains Springfield's lack of consistent 
productivity improvements during Lee and Robb's tenure as 
superintendents (1815-1841).5 They then suggest that significant 
improvements in output and reductions in piece rates that 
occurred after 1840 were mainly at tr ibutable to the infusion of a 
3The reader is cautioned from inferring connections between armory pro-
duction and general manufacturing policies in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. The two were always different because of the greater accountability to 
outsiders (the government) involved in armory production. 
4For specific details of Springfield's accounting methods and procedures see 
payrolls and accounts of U.S. armories and arsenals, 1816-50, Second Auditor's 
Accounts, Records of the United States General Accounting Office, Record 
Group 217, National Archives. 
5Hoskin and Macve refer to statistics regarding the output of barrel welders 
as their basis for assessing productivity improvement. See Note 11 for more 
details on specific production figures. 
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forceful West Point managerial component. They argue that 
pre-1840s armory management were untrained and ill-equipped 
to enforce labor discipline and improve productivity, and thus 
were unable to fully utilize accounting information and proce-
dures. Other evidence suggests, however, that the armory's 
accounting system was appropriate to and fully supportive of 
the needs of armory management, especially during Lee's tenure 
as superintendent (1815-1833), and that major changes in the 
use of accounting after 1840 were in response to a dramatically 
changed social and economic environment. 
As mentioned earlier, the Ordnance Department under the 
leadership of Colonel Wadsworth became the overseer of armory 
affairs in 1815. Wadsworth was assisted by a group of West 
Point officers who also believed in the goals of parts uniformity 
and interchangeability [Hounshell, 1982]. In fact, Wadsworth's 
motto, "Uniformity, Simplicity and Solidarity," formed the 
basis of early Ordnance Department policy [Smith, 1977]. 
In his detailed examination of the Springfield armory in 
1819, Major Dalliba indicated that "complete accountability is 
established and enforced throughout" and the armory's piece-
rate accounting system was " the best of all possible plans" 
[American State Papers, 1823, p. 542]. According to Deyrup 
[1970, p. 49], the armory "was outstanding for its excellent 
management and high efficiency" during Lee's superinten-
dency. Springfield armory's accounting controls have also been 
described as " the most sophisticated used in any American 
industrial establishment before the 1840s" [Chandler, 1977, p. 
74]. 
Hoskin and Macve [1988] assert that a particular type of 
management training was needed in order for the role of 
accounting to change after 1840, but several other factors 
appear to better explain why piece-rate accounting and a 
clock-regulated workday were not integrated at the Springfield 
armory before that time. The following factors are examined 
regarding this lack of integration: skilled labor shortages and 
labor's resistance to controls, cooperative knowledge and cost 
sharing among arms makers, and the absence of significant 
labor decrafting. 
LABOR SHORTAGES AND RESISTANCE TO CONTROLS 
Deyrup [1970] indicated that acute shortages of skilled 
labor were a major factor that contributed to the early business 
failures of private arms contractors. Because of these shortages, 
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as well as New Englanders' natural propensity toward indepen-
dence and mobility [Prude, 1983], employers were precluded 
from setting piece rates that would extract exceptionally high 
labor output, and they would be hard-pressed to enforce norms 
of behavior and work discipline. In his 1819 report, Dalliba 
described how piece rates Were set by Superintendent Lee at 
Springfield to provide a reasonable wage for reasonable effort, 
and without contrary evidence, how they were set in the larger 
private armories as well: 
The prices paid for the working of each piece have 
been settled by the superintendent, upon the result of 
much experiment. It is calculated that good industrial 
men will be able to earn $1.40 per day. Upon this 
basis the prices have been established. The workmen 
earn now from $20 to $60 per month; such is the 
difference in the skill, industry, and ambition of men 
of the same trade. There are, however, but three or 
four in the 244 (total number of workman) who come 
up to $60 per month. [American State Papers, 1823, p. 
542] 
In effect, skilled-labor cost control was obtained by com-
puting and maintaining a piece-rate system that provided a 
reasonable wage for reasonable effort. In both the private and 
the national armories, the majority of laborers were remuner-
ated on a piece-rate basis.6 Piece-rate accounting was intro-
duced at Springfield in 1806 and at Harpers Ferry in 1809. It 
was described in 1819 as "the best of all possible plans" 
[American State Papers, 1823, p. 542], and still was credited in 
1855 as providing "the greatest amount of work at the least cost 
to the employer" [Rosenberg, 1969, p. 193]. 
According to several historians, skilled labor shortages in 
the United States in the early 1800s encouraged technological 
innovation and stimulated the subdivision of work processes 
into precise, specialized tasks [Habakkuk, 1962; Smith, 1977]. In 
the arms industry at least, production tasks were narrowed and 
simplified not in response to new manufacturing methods, nor 
to control an unruly labor force [Nelson, 1981], but rather to 
achieve technical and economic objectives (e.g., greater uni-
formity and efficiency). At Harpers Ferry, for example, the 
greatest growth in the number of occupation classes occurred 
6Dalliba reported that of the 244 workmen employed at the Springfield 
armory in 1819, all but 52 were paid by the piece. Even in 1850, only 76 of 348 
workers were paid exclusively by the day or month. 
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between 1811 and 1816, a time of severe labor shortages, rather 
than during the 1820s and 1830s, a period of greater mechanical 
innovation. 
Initially, accounting procedures at Springfield were not 
integrated with a clocked workday to produce pre-specified 
norms probably because highly skilled labor would have re-
jected such a system. In rural antebellum communities, for 
instance, work time was never precisely defined and little effort 
was made to control the pace of work [Prude, 1983]. In the early 
19th century work culture, farm, craft, and other skilled workers 
were generally responsible for setting their own pace and work 
time and were compensated according to task rather than by 
time. In his 1819 report, Dalliba noted that on-the-job drinking, 
conversing, and socializing were the norms of behavior in most 
factories. Faler [1974, p. 379] similarly indicated that workplace 
drinking was part of the pre-industrial culture that did not 
stress "the subordination of pleasure to productive labor." 
Smith has argued [1977, p. 67] that the ability to impose labor 
discipline at the armories was inversely related to employees' 
skill level: 
Since they were extremely sensitive about their 
rights and privileges as skilled artisans, particular 
care had to be taken not to treat them with condes-
cension. No man worth his salt would stand at com-
mand or submit to even the most perfunctory regula-
tions unless he was accorded the dignity and freedom 
that his skilled status deserved. 
Until around 1830, the Springfield armory "was outstand-
ing for its excellent management and high efficiency" [Deyrup, 
1970, p. 49]. Under John Robb, Lee's civilian successor from 
1833 until 1841, management was relaxed, work discipline 
generally deteriorated, and Springfield's labor and capital costs 
significantly escalated. The expansion and prosperity of the 
early 1830s was followed by a period of strikes, union activity, 
and a reduction in daily working hours. The increase in labor's 
power vis-a-vis armory management at this time exceeded, but 
still paralleled the relationship in the private sector. However, 
the panic of 1837 and the resulting economic depression left 
workers defenseless against employers seeking to restore long 
hours [Laurie, 1974]. Clearly the arms-making environment had 
changed by 1841 when Lt. Col. George Talcott, inspector of 
armories, reported to the Secretary of War that the practice of 
allowing workers to fix their own wages, privileges, and working 
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hours would not be tolerated in a private business and should 
not be condoned at Springfield [Benet, 1878]. 
COOPERATIVE KNOWLEDGE AND COST SHARING 
The Ordnance Department, under the leadership of Colonel 
Wadsworth, activley promoted cooperation among the private 
and national armories in order to achieve uniformity and 
interchangeability of small parts. For example, Wadsworth 
conducted a two-day meeting in 1815 to disseminate his uni-
formity principles and to establish the s tandards of manufac-
ture for military muskets. The participants at the meeting 
included Superintendents Roswell Lee of Springfield and James 
Stubblefield of Harpers Ferry, and Eli Whitney. Whitney was 
the largest and most influential of the original private arms 
makers. In addition to his near total dependence on government 
contracts, Whitney's willingness to share technical information 
was partially based on the close personal relationships he 
maintained with Wadsworth and Lee.7 Letters written between 
Lee, Wadsworth, and Whitney between 1815 and 1819 show that 
Whitney shared technical details and actually offered barrel 
turning machinery to the Springfield armory.8 As a result of 
frequent interactions among the key members of the arms-
making community, trade secrets apparently did not exist, at 
least during Lee's superintendency. 
According to Uselding [1973], Springfield's pr imary role 
was to extend arms-making inventions to more technically 
advanced stages so that production methods and innovations 
could be rapidly diffused throughout the industry. Armory 
superintendents were directed by Wadsworth to cooperate with 
7Smith [1981, p.68] described Wadsworth as "an intimate friend" of Whit-
ney, while Lee had worked at Eli Whitney's private armory and was recom-
mended by him for a position at the Ordnance Department. Mirsky and Nevins 
[1952] and Deyrup [1970] referred to many of the letters that were exchanged 
among these individuals. For more details see Letters Sent-Letters Received and 
Reports of Inspections of Arsenals and Depots in the Records of the Office of the 
Chief of Ordnance, Record Group 156, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
8Whitney had invented the cotton gin in 1793 and was continually seeking 
judicial relief for patent infringements on this invention. Given his experiences, 
Whitney's decision to offer Lee a machine for turning barrels is more under-
standable, since men, materials, costs, and technical information were routinely 
shared during this time. Regarding his decision, Whitney wrote: " . . . But the 
probability is that some person would contract to make barrels & not only take 
advantage of my invention but entice away the workmen whom I had instructed 
in the use of the Machine before I could be compensated for the experience of 
making it." 
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each other "in all matters related to management and manufac-
turing on the uniformity principle" [Smith, 1981, p. 71]. To 
partially fulfill this charge, the national armories were open to 
all visitors, and skilled workers, raw materials, patterns for 
machines, and manufacturing processes were regularly ex-
changed among the national and private armories. 
Private contractors were also apprised that future arms 
contracts would depend on the degree they cooperated with the 
Ordnance Department in sharing new inventions and other 
relevant information. Arms making was such a cooperative 
endeavor that important technological innovations are unable 
to be traced specifically to particular individuals. Instead they 
were perceived as evolving "through a remarkable process of 
cooperation, transfer, and convergence" [Smith, 1973, p. 591]. 
The full sharing of technical and production cost data also 
enabled the arms makers to control labor rates and limit wage-
motivated turnover within the industry. According to Mirsky & 
Nevins [1952, p. 268], Lee and Whitney worked together and had 
"a tight control over the labor market" and thus effectively 
created an oligopsony for armory workers" [Uselding 1973]. 
This evidence suggests that during the period of full cooper-
ation, arms makers were able to delay implementation of a 
comprehensive labor-accounting system due, in part , to their 
ability to openly, regularly, and completely share all relevant 
cost information. Gentlemen's agreements and personal dis-
course would be clearly preferred to a comprehensive labor 
accounting system that might encounter strong resistance from 
a work force unaculturated to clock-paced work standards and 
intrusive labor repor t ing requi rements . Demanding pre-
specified norms of output from workers having widely variant 
skill levels9 may also have led to intolerable levels of intra-
industry turnover given the shortages of skilled labor that were 
experienced in New England at that t ime. 
Until the early 1840s, the government's monopoly pur-
chasing power allowed the policy of shared cooperative knowl-
edge to be enforced and sustained. After that time, new and 
more competitive private arms makers entered an industry that 
was expanding rapidly and the earlier cooperative spirit natur-
ally broke down. Once the cooperative period ended and a 
united labor policy disappeared, a more integrative labor ac-
counting system was needed. And only after a rms making 
9See Dalliba's comments in an earlier section. 
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became highly mechanized and labor had been significantly 
decrafted would pre-specified norms of output be established. 
ARMS MAKING AND LABOR DECRAFTING 
At the time of Major Dalliba's inspection in 1819, arms-
making machinery had not developed to the point where labor 
productivity was independent of the skills of the individual 
worker. Even though Springfield's production workers were 
subdivided into more than 86 different occupations by 1820, 
attaining complete uniformity of work and full interchange-
ability of par ts was both unobtainable and unwarranted given 
existing cost and quality criteria. According to Dalliba in his 
1819 report: 
. . . Different men have different visions; they do not 
see alike, and they do not feel alike; and as the 
accuracy of par ts depends upon the vision and feeling 
of the workmen, the parts made by them must vary. 
[American State Papers, 1823, p. 543]. 
From its beginning, the Springfield armory followed a 
policy of paying wages above the industry average in order to 
maintain a stable force of skilled workers given labor shortages 
and the limited upward job mobility at the national armories 
[Deyrup, 1970]. Over time, as the vast majority of arms-making 
tasks evolved from craft judgement to machine tending, this 
wage-rate policy became unnecessary. Lt. Col. Talcott's report 
to the Secretary of War in July, 1841 reveals how dramatically 
the arms making labor market had changed: 
The difficulty of finding good armorers no longer 
exists; they abound in every machine-shop and 
manufactory throughout the country. The skill of the 
eye and the hand, acquired by practice alone, is no 
longer indispensable; and if every operative was at 
once discharged from the Springfield armory, their 
places could be supplied with competent hands in a 
week. [Benet, 1878, p. 397]. 
Until the late 1830s, the Ordnance Department gave much 
greater priority to perfecting the system of interchangeable 
parts manufacture than to improving cost efficiency. In fact, the 
Department never really expected significant cost reductions 
before this time [Hounshell, 1982]. Thereafter, machine capital 
was increasingly substituted for manual labor and the craft 
skills of the average arms worker declined significantly. By 
9
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1850, all fabrication was carried out by machine except for 
barrel welding. Once parts uniformity and interchangeability 
had been achieved, and labor shortages had been eliminated, 
improving labor efficiency became the new and natural focus of 
Ordnance Department management. 
INCREASES IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
Hoskin and Macve [1988] have argued that West Point 
management methods10 best explain the major increases in 
barrel welding productivity that occurred at Springfield armory 
after 1840 when J. W. Ripley became superintendent.11 They 
recognize that Decius Wadsworth and George Bromford, Wads-
worth's successor as chief of Ordnance from 1821-1842, both 
came under the West Point influence,12 but contend that the 
physical presence of West Pointers trained by Sylvanus Thayer 
was the key determinant of the productivity increase at Spring-
field.13 Smith [1981] acknowledged that tighter rules, clocked 
days, regularized procedures, and greater factory discipline all 
occurred during Colonel Ripley's superintendency. Hoskin and 
Macve [1988, p. 38] go much further, however, in contending 
that West Point management methods caused the increase in 
labor productivity, allowed accounting to be more fully utilized, 
and were "of crucial significance in business and accounting 
history." 
Ascribing multifarious influences to West Point manage-
ment methods is alluring, especially when invoking power-
knowledge rationales for accounting procedures. In the case of 
the Springfield armory after 1840, however, several economic 
factors stand out. The depression that began in 1839 resulted in 
10Hoskin and Macve describe in great detail the human accountability 
techniques that were introduced at West Point by Sylvanus Thayer during the 
period of his superintendency (1817-1833). 
11Hoskin and Macve (HM) reproduce figures from Deyrup showing a 
significant rise in average barrels welded per man after 1842. The increase was 
from a figure no higher than 2,500 before 1840 to an average of 4,000 after 1842. 
HM reference Uselding [1972] when arguing that this increase was not due to 
improvements in technical factors. They suggest that the West Point manage-
ment style and technique is the most likely explanatory factor for the produc-
tivity increase. 
12Wadsworth and Bromford were West Pointers from before Thayer's 
superintendency. 
13 Until 1841, Congress mandated that the national armories come under 
civil superintendency. Accordingly, both Lee and Robb were civilians and not 
career military men. 
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major price and wage declines in the private sector.14 Rezneck 
[1935] noted that there were nationwide givebacks of wages and 
working hours during this time. 
Barrel-welding output probably increased at Springfield 
because of higher and more regularized working hour require-
ments and piece-rate reductions of over 50 percent that occurred 
between 1841 and 1844. The new armory policies resulted from 
the 1841 War Department examination that identified the in-
congruity of private and national armory practices regarding 
work rules, wages, and regulations.15 Given the economics of the 
day, armory workers apparently had to accept the new work 
requirements, and the increases in output and productivity that 
resulted did little more than restore the real income levels of 
prior years. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the larger, competitive arms-making environment that 
emerged after 1840, there was far more industrial secrecy and 
much less opportunity for firms to share information about 
costs, methods, and innovations. Labor costs that formerly had 
been regulated by a few key players via tacit agreement and 
personal discourse, could now be controlled only by managerial 
pressure, work discipline, and an accounting system that intro-
duced norms of output . West Point training and discipline 
probably helped managers perform their work, but this par-
ticular background should not be given undue credit for in-
creasing productivity and bringing fundamental change to ac-
counting and accountability systems. Economic and social 
forces appear to be far more significant. 
The depression that ended in 1843 was followed by 14 years 
of phenomenal growth and westward expansion [Taylor, 1951]. 
During that time, private sector demand for small arms in-
creased and private arms makers were no longer dependent on 
14During this period, wholesale prices fell between 25 and 50 percent [U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1960]. 
15In September 1841, a three-man board appointed by the Department of 
War conducted a detailed examination of conditions and management at the 
Springfield armory. They confirmed Talcott's earlier comments about high 
wages and slack work rules. In their report to Congress in 1841, the War 
Department examining board indicated that "in all the private establishments 
which were visited by the board, the hours of labor are fixed by regulation" and 
"In looking into the prices of labor, the board became satisfied that the workmen 
on the different parts of the musket are very unequally paid" [Benet, 1878, p. 
401]. 
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government contracts for continued viability. The trend toward 
fuller labor accountability at Springfield that occurred under 
Ripley appears to parallel procedures that existed in private 
manufactories in light of comments made in the 1841 War 
Department report. More research on this aspect of accounting 
history is needed to uncover private industry practices and to 
better assess the impact of particular management methods and 
techniques on the development of accounting. 
In her study of 19th century business practice, McGaw 
[1985] concludes that accounting has been support ive of 
technological change and has supplied owners with the infor-
mation they needed to manage. This suggests that an integrated 
labor accounting and accountability system was not needed at 
the Springfield armory much before 1841. Until that time, a 
comprehensive piece-rate system supplemented by shared 
cooperative knowledge of current costs and production methods 
may have elicited all the accountability that arms workers 
would have tolerated and probably furnished all the labor cost 
information that armory management expected or could use. 
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